

**Real Estate Portfolio  
Allocation  
The European Consumers'  
Perspective**

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**Abstract**

Owner occupied housing contributes to increases in household savings and the stability of consumption in developed countries. It also contributes to other social goals. But owner-occupied housing is also a risky investment. This paper synthesizes existing knowledge about the riskiness of housing investment in European economies during the past quarter century. It also presents estimates of the potential gains to European consumers from investments in derivatives which may reduce risk at the individual level. We find that futures markets in house price indexes may increase portfolio returns for European investors by several percentage points at the same level of risk. We also consider practical steps to develop markets for these investments.

JEL Codes: G11, R21, G13

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## **I. Introduction**

Owner-occupied housing plays a unique role in developed countries such as the United States and Western Europe. This role encompasses the mobilization of individual savings and the stimulation of consumption, as well as the contribution of housing to a variety of non economic outcomes such as the production of “social capital” in various forms.

But owner-occupied housing is a risky investment. It represents a large fraction of household assets and net worth, and house prices have proven to be quite volatile, even in highly developed diversified economies. Thus, there are potentially large gains to policies which reduce the riskiness of investment in owner-occupied housing, especially for young households.

This paper provides new quantitative evidence on the ability of well-designed housing derivatives to reduce the riskiness of housing investment at the individual level. This evidence is presented for ten developed countries: eight continental European countries, the United Kingdom and the United States. We find that there are potentially large gains to households from investments in house price indexes and in other forms of risk reducing derivatives. Although our estimates are uncertain and are based upon short time series, we find that the opportunity to invest in house price indexes consistently increases risk adjusted portfolio returns by several percentage points, not by several basis points.

In Section II, below, we review the accumulating evidence on the unique role of housing in the economies of highly developed economies. In Section III, we compare homeownership with investments in other forms of wealth, documenting the dominant position of home equities in wealth portfolios. In this section, we analyze the time series on housing prices for a panel of fourteen developed countries to document the riskiness of investment in modern industrial economies.

Section IV presents new evidence on the potential gains which a derivative market might achieve. We begin by reviewing the results for Sweden reported by Englund *et al*, in 2002. We then use data from the Global Financial Data Base, together with the panel of housing prices analyzed in Section III, to extend this work to ten countries. We find large gains to policies which encourage the hedging of housing risk.

Section V discusses some practical details in pursuing these policies, and it provides a brief conclusion.

## **II. The Role of Housing Investment**

By now the key role of housing in the health of national economies has been well established. This role has important microeconomic and macroeconomic components. On the micro side, homeownership has proven to be a powerful vehicle for wealth accumulation by owners, but also an important vehicle for renters as well. For current

homeowners, the institutions facilitating the purchase of dwellings are almost perfectly aligned with household incentives to save.

The long-term self-amortizing mortgage contract means that most purchasers make fixed monthly payments over the twenty or thirty year life of the mortgage contract. These payments may not be easily distinguished from monthly rent payments, especially by less sophisticated households. Indeed, in the early years of a long-term mortgage, the monthly payments are in fact pretty similar to rent payments; they are mostly interest payments and only a small fraction goes to the retirement of principal. The correspondence between regular fixed payments and the regular enjoyment of service flows reinforces the perception that payments are simply rents (See Thaler, 1990). Moreover, the nature of the contract imposes dire penalties on those who fail to follow through on the program of forced saving embedded in a mortgage contract. It is hard to imagine another contract savings program which threatened low savers with eviction.

There is also increasing evidence that housing markets and housing prices influence the savings decisions of renters. For example, Yoshikawa and Ohtake (1989) analyzed the land and housing market in Japan, finding that increases in the prices of housing and raw land stimulated current savings among those who could reasonably expect someday to become homeowners. Engelhardt (1994) found a similar effect of housing prices upon the savings behavior of renters seeking to become homeowners in Canada, and Sheiner (1995) reported analogous effects for the United States. Homeownership, or the prospect thereof, has been found to stimulate and facilitate savings among consumers.

The aggregate importance of the household savings facilitated by homeownership should not be underestimated. During the 1990s, much was made about the so called “savings puzzle” in the U.S, that is, the very low estimated savings rate among U.S. consumers relative to the personal savings rates estimated for other developed countries, especially Japan. However, as shown by Gale and Sabelhause (1999), if unrealized capital gains in housing are included in both the income and the savings of the household sector (as suggested by the original Haig-Simons criteria for defining income), then the aggregate personal savings rate in the U.S. is much higher. In fact, household savings rates in the U.S. are, according to these calculations, at about the same level as those in Japan, and are significantly higher than those in Europe.

On the macro side, there is increasing evidence that the wealth effects from homeownership have positively stimulated consumption, in the U.S. and in other OECD countries. In comparison, there is more limited evidence, based upon aggregate time series data, that variations in stock market wealth do affect consumption (See Poterba, 2000, for a survey and Dynan and Maki, 2001, for more recent evidence.) But the estimated effects of financial wealth upon consumption are small.

In contrast, there is clear evidence that housing market wealth affects aggregate consumption. Moreover, the magnitude of the wealth effect is larger for housing wealth than for financial wealth. For example, Case *et al* (2005) analyzed time series data for US states during 1982-1999 and for a panel of OECD countries during 1975-1999. For

both samples, they found large and statistically significant effects of housing wealth upon household consumption.

For the panel of developed countries, for example, it is estimated that a ten percent increase in housing wealth increases consumption by roughly 1.1 percent, while a similar increase in stock market wealth has virtually no effect upon consumption. Subsequently, these qualitative results have been confirmed by analogous time series analyses of Korean data (Kim and Lee, 2005) and Swedish data (Chen and Chen, 2005).

Homeownership and housing wealth have important economic consequences for individual consumers, and also for the economics in which they operate.


More recently, there has been increasing attention to the non-economic benefits of homeownership. In a series of papers, researchers have found that increased levels of owner occupation are related to increased voting and political participation (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999), to objective measures of neighborhood improvement (DiPasquale, and Glaeser, 1999), to child outcomes (Haurin, Parcel, and Haurin, 2002), to increases in private philanthropy (Rossi and Webber, 1996), and to various measures of household “satisfaction.” Some of the early evidence reported is not based upon adequate controls for the fact that homeowners are richer, better educated, and more socially advantaged than renters. But enough of the recent evidence is based upon credible instruments and statistical models that a positive relationship between homeownership *per se* and social outcomes seems quite reasonable.

### III. Homeownership and Other Investments

At the individual level, it is instructive to compare homeownership (and hence home equity) with other components of household wealth: cash and bank accounts; stocks bonds and other securities; pension fund wealth; and consumer durables. Here the overwhelming importance of homeownership in household wealth is striking. In Australia, for example, home equity is more than three times as important as stocks, bonds, other securities and bank account proceeds combined as a component of net worth (167 billion AUD versus 53 billion AUD, at the means, in 2001). Further inspection of the sources of household wealth reveals that virtually all non housing wealth is concentrated at the top of the wealth distribution. For example, at the third quintile, home equity was fully ten times as important as all financial wealth (stocks, bonds, securities, and bank accounts) combined, as a component of privately held wealth i.e., 250 Billion AUD versus 25 billion AUD at the mean. (See Caplin *et al*, 2003 for an extensive discussion of the Australian circumstance.)

Figure 1 provides another illustration. It reports time series information for Italy during the past forty years. The figure indicates the importance of housing, financial assets, and consumer durables in the aggregate net worth of the household sector. During the entire period, housing never accounted for less than half of household wealth, and at some points it accounted for as much as 68 percent of private non pension wealth. Of financial wealth, which in the aggregate represented 27-42 percent of total wealth, savings accounts and government bonds represented more than half.

**Figure 1**  
**Composition of Household Net Worth in Italy, 1965-2002**  
**(Percent)**





The major reasons for the importance of housing in private wealth and its increasing importance over time in developed countries are the high levels of owner occupancy and the increasing levels of homeownership over time. Table 1 reports national homeownership rates in a recent year for nineteen developed countries. For ten of these countries, owner occupancy exceeds 70 percent. And for two others, the U.S. and Canada, rates of owner occupancy are only slightly below 70 percent. Of the other seven countries, three have had a long tradition of social rental housing (Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden), and their rates of homeownership are barely above 50 percent. But recent increases in homeownership rates have been highest in the Netherlands, averaging 1.1 percent per year during most of the nineties.

Figure 2 summarizes changes in homeownership rates for those developed countries for which historical data are available. With the exception of Denmark and Finland, the trend in home ownership has shown a systematic increase. Note, however that mobility rates are lower in Europe. Thus, these trends in owner occupancy are consistent with a much larger increase in home purchase rates for those households making current tenure choices.

Table 2 disaggregates home ownership rates in those classified as “young entrant” households and those classified as “mid life” households. (Young entrant households are defined as two adults aged 25 or younger, without children.) As is clear from the table, much of the difference in homeownership rates between younger and older households reflects national differences in the customary loan-to-value ratios for newly issued


**Table 1**  
**Levels and Increases in Home Ownership in OECD Countries**

Country	Ownership Rate (Percent)	Year	Annual Increase (Percent)	Time Period
Australia	70	1999	0.0	1994-1999
Austria	57	2001	-	-
Belgium	74	1999	-	-
Canada	66	2001	0.3	1991-2001
Czech Republic	47	2001	-	-
Denmark	55	1999	-0.1	1990-1999
Finland	71	2001	-0.8	1992-2001
France	56	2002	0.1	1990-2002
Germany	41	2001	-	-
Greece	80	2001	0.2	1987-2001
Hungary	92	2001	-	-
Iceland	78	2003	-	-
Lithuania	84	2003	-	-
Netherlands	53	1998	1.1	1993-1998
Portugal	76	1999	-	-
Slovenia	82	2002	1.3	1991-2002
Sweden	55	2002	0.0	1991-1997
U.K.	70	2002	0.3	1994-2002
U.S.A	68	2002	0.3	1991-2002

Source: Scanlon, Kathleen and Christine Whitehead, *International Trends in Housing Tenure and Mortgage Finance*, London: Council of Mortgage Lenders, 2004, pp. 10, 13.

Figure 2

Homeownership Rates in OECD Countries



mortgages. For example, in France younger households have only a 17 percent homeownership rate while the rate for older households is 71 percent. In part this difference reflects the fact that, in France, the average down payment is forty percent of house value. Low homeownership rates among young households in the Czech Republic reflect, in part, the fact that average down payments are sixty percent of house value. Relatively few young households have the accumulated savings to afford such large down payments.


For those young households that can afford home purchase, the housing asset as a fraction of their net worth is frighteningly large. Figure 3 reports estimates of that percentage as a function of age for Sweden and for the U.S. For the U.S, mean house value is 350 percent of net worth for younger homeowners, aged 18-30. At older ages, the percentage is still large – 159 percent for those aged 41 to 50 and 65 percent for those over the age of 70. For Sweden, the qualitative pattern is the same. For homeownership households aged 25 to 34, house values are 258 percent of mean net worth. Again, this percentage declines with age, but at age 75 mean house value is still about 80 percent of mean net worth.

**Table 2**  
**Owner Occupancy Rates for Young-Entrant and Mid Life**  
**Households and Average Loan-to-Value (LTV) Ratios**

Country	Owner Occupancy Rates		Average LTV (Percent)
	Young Entrant (Percent)	Mid Life (Percent)	
Australia	47	80	95
Austria	48	64	-
Belgium	33	89	83
Canada	47	74	-
Czech Republic	29	48	40
Denmark	20	64	80
Finland	39	85	77
France	17	71	60
Germany	49	89	70
Hungary	95	96	70
Iceland	70	90	70
Lithuania	61	90	82
Netherlands	44	77	87
Slovenia	46	78	-
Sweden	46	85	85
U.K.	59	87	75
U.S.A	62	81	76

Source: Scanlon, Kathleen and Christine Whitehead, *International Trends in Housing Tenure and Mortgage Finance*, London: Council of Mortgage Lenders, 2004, pp. 17, 29.

**Figure 3**  
**Mean House Value as a Percentage of Mean Net Worth**  
**Sweden and the United States**




This, of course, means that the wealth of homeowners, especially young homeowners, is very heavily dependent upon the course of housing prices. Alternatively, the risks to the financial well being of households are large if the volatility of housing prices is large.

Figures 4A and 4B summarize all currently available information on housing price movements in developed countries. In each figure, the movement of housing prices is recorded from 1975 through 1998, relative to price levels observed in 1990. The variability in housing prices is enormous. For example, Figure 4A reports that house prices in Denmark declined by 35 percent between 1986 and 1990 and house prices in Finland declined by 32 percent between 1990 and 1992. House prices in Ireland increased by 60 percent between 1990 and 1998. Figure 4B reports a 50 percent increase in house prices in the Netherlands between 1990 and 1998 and a 33 percent decline in house prices in Norway between 1987 and 1990.

These changes in housing prices translate directly into volatilities in housing wealth. Figures 5A and 5B report annual variations in owner-occupied housing wealth per capita relative to its level in 1990. Figure 5A reports that housing wealth per capita declined by 40 percent in Finland between 1990 and 1993. Figure 5B indicates that per capita owner occupied housing wealth doubled in Spain between 1984 and 1990.


The volatility of housing prices and the implied volatility of household net wealth is enormous. This volatility may not be of major concern if the mobility of households is sufficiently low. Indeed, as Sinai and Souleles (2003) have argued, for a household who

**Figure 4A**  
 Evolution of Real Housing Prices Across OECD Countries  
 (1990 = 100)





**Figure 4B**  
**Evolution of Real Housing Prices Across OECD Countries**  
 (1990 = 100)




will never contemplate a move from its current metropolitan housing market, homeownership provides a form of “consumption insurance,” protecting the household from the potential increases in rent that may subsequently arise from price volatility. Mobility rates are somewhat lower in European countries than in the United States. Nevertheless, recent increases in residential mobility are pronounced, and the prospect of European integration will increase labor mobility in Europe and across of the European Union (EU) member states (MacLennan, 1996).

Table 3 reports these trends. As reported by the OECD, foreign workers from other EU countries increased by 229 percent between 1985 and 2000 in Denmark and increased by more than 100 percent in Luxemburg and in the UK. The percent increase in all foreign workers as a fraction of the labor force was 216 percent for Austria, almost 200 percent for Denmark, and over 100 percent for Germany, Luxemburg, Sweden, and the U.K. During a shorter period 1990-1999, foreign workers as a fraction of the labor force increased by more than 300 percent in Italy, by more than 200 percent in Norway and Belgium and by 193 percent in Spain. France is the only exception to these trends.

This greatly increased international mobility of workers means that households are more directly exposed to losses in wealth arising from temporal variations in housing prices. For middle income households who contemplate careers requiring mobility across EU states, the amplitudes of wealth movements reported in Table 5 may be quite significant.


Figure 5A

Evolution of Real Housing Wealth Per Capita Across OECD Countries  
(1990 = 100)



**Figure 5B**

**Evolution of Real Housing Wealth Per Capita Across OECD Countries  
(1990 = 100)**



**Table 3**  
**Increased Labor Mobility in Selected Countries**

A. Percent Increase in Foreign Workers from EU Countries

	<u>1985-2000</u>
Denmark	229
France	-29
Luxembourg	166
U.K.	107

B. Percent Increase in Foreign Workers as Fraction of the Labor Force

	<u>1985-2000</u>
Austria	216
Denmark	193
France	-12
Germany	141
Luxembourg	150
Sweden	108
U.K.	121
	<u>1990-1999</u>
Belgium	216
Spain	193
Norway	229
Italy	302

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,  
*Continuous Reporting System on Migration*, 1987 edition, 1989 edition.  
*Trends in International Migration*, 2002. Paris, OECD.

#### IV. Reducing Risk

The variability reported in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that there may be substantial benefits to policies which permit or encourage homeowners to hedge their lumpy investments in homeownership. The basic argument is put forward forcefully by Case, Shiller, and Weiss in a 1993 paper. Two papers, Englund *et al* (2002) and Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné (2003) have analyzed the issue empirically and both have estimated substantial gains to the establishment of derivative markets for housing prices. Table 4, simplified from Englund *et al* (2002) reports the correlations among four assets available for investment by households in Stockholm during the 1990s. As reported in the table, the correlations among returns to investments in stocks, bonds, and t-bills are moderate, suggesting clear advantages to a diversified portfolio of investments. In the fourth column, we report the correlations when households are also permitted to invest in individual owner-occupied houses. As indicated in the table, the correlation between the returns to investment in individual houses and the stock market is very low, and the correlation between the returns to housing and bonds is negative. Clearly housing investment increases the potential returns to Stockholm households. The final column adds the opportunity to invest in an index of housing prices to the set of investment alternatives. The housing index has the same expected return as investment in an individual house, but a different variance. As indicated in the table, with a five year horizon, the correlation is high, 0.73, but is not perfect.

**Table 4**  
**Correlations among asset returns in Sweden**  
**1990-2002**  
**(five year horizon)**

	<u>Stocks</u>	<u>Bonds</u>	<u>t-bills</u>	<u>Houses</u>	<u>Housing Index</u>
Stocks	1.00	0.25	0.04	0.04	0.05
Bonds		1.00	0.69	-0.36	-0.49
t-bills			1.00	-0.26	-0.35
Houses				1.00	0.73

\* Source: Peter Englund, *et al*, "Hedging Housing Risk," *Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics*, 21 (1), 2002, p. 172.


Figure 6 reports the financial implications of the higher variance in the course of prices for individual houses relative to the course of an index for housing prices. The dashed line reports the efficient frontier – the tradeoff between the mean and the variance of returns – when consumers can invest in financial instruments and in the purchase of an owner –occupied dwelling. The frontier has the familiar convex shape reflecting the fact that higher average returns come at the expense of higher average risks. The solid line reflects the estimated frontier when households are also free to invest in an index of local housing prices. As indicated in the figure, the addition of this investment opportunity shifts the efficient frontier by a substantial amount. Indeed, households are able to earn an additional one or two percent portfolio return at the same level of risk by investing in the index. If this option were available, households would, at the time they purchased owner-occupied housing, sell the index of local housing prices. Over time, they would buy back the index. The tied transaction would reduce aggregate risk because returns to the two investments – individual houses and the house price index – are positively but imperfectly correlated.

## **V. Orders of Magnitude of Risk Reduction in Europe**

The evidence reported for Sweden in Section IV was based upon an index of house prices for Stockholm estimated from transactions data (See Englund *et al*, 1999) and information on the relationship between individual prices and the price index. In particular, the empirical analyses underlying these estimates rely upon micro data on house sales to estimate distributions. These distributions were relied upon by Iacoviello



**Figure 6**  
**Mean-Variance Efficient Frontier for Swedish Homeowners**



and Ortalo-Magné, 2003, in their related analysis of hedging housing market risk in London.

In this section, we present additional evidence for other European countries using the panels of housing price data reported in Figures 4A and 4B and using financial data from the Global Financial Data Base for each country. The housing price and financial data cover various periods from 1975-1999 and are reported annually. The data consist of panels of 25 annual observations for two countries (the U.S. and the U.K, 1975 -1999) and 22 observations for five countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, 1975-1996). Fourteen annual observations are available for Canada (1983-1996), and twelve are available for Norway (1985-1996). Eleven observations are available for Spain (1986-1996.)

By subtraction, we create a panel of observations on the annual returns to investment in t-bills, bonds, equities, and a housing index. The index of prices for individual houses was constructed to have the same annual mean as the house price index and the same autocorrelation and variance (relative to the index) as used in Englund, *et al*, 2002 . This procedure closely follows that of Iacoviello and Ortalo-Magné in adapting Swedish data for their analysis of London.

**Table 5**  
**Correlation of Housing Returns**  
**with Returns to Investment in t-bills,**  
**Bonds, and Equities**

Country	Years	one-year time horizon			five-year time horizon		
		t-bills	bonds	equities	t-bills	bonds	equities
Belgium	1975-1996	0.01	-0.02	-0.26	0.18	0.12	-0.36
Canada	1983-1996	-0.24	-0.23	0.13	-0.67	-0.07	0.57
Denmark	1975-1996	0.14	0.25	0.28	0.06	0.31	0.32
France	1975-1996	-0.39	-0.37	-0.27	-0.19	-0.24	-0.32
Netherlands	1975-1996	-0.15	-0.09	0.02	0.13	0.01	-0.09
Norway	1985-1996	-0.23	-0.04	-0.04	-0.66	-0.56	-0.16
Spain	1986-1996	-0.67	-0.16	-0.09	-0.95	0.47	-0.27
Sweden	1975-1996	0.05	-0.04	-0.03	0.18	0.23	-0.52
United Kingdom	1975-1999	0.02	0.04	-0.00	0.13	0.31	0.40
United States	1975-1999	-0.13	0.24	0.13	0.33	0.41	-0.03

Source: See text for assumptions and methods.

Based upon these panels of aggregate returns of differing lengths, the variance-covariance matrix of annual returns was estimated for each country. Table 5 summarizes the co-variances in returns between housing investments and investments in other assets: t-bills, bonds, and equities. For each country, the table reports the correlation between investment in housing and in the three other assets. It is clear from the table, that the short-term correlations are quite low. The highest correlations are between housing returns and bonds in the U.S. and in Denmark (0.24 to 0.25) and the correlation between housing returns and equities in Denmark. Of the correlations reported in the table, for a one-year time horizon, 19 are negative. When the time horizon is extended to five years, the simple correlations in returns are higher, up to 0.95 for t-bills and housing for Spain (but not that the computations for Spain are based upon ten observations on annual returns). Most of the simple correlations are well below 0.5. This suggests that there are substantial returns to the inclusion of housing in the investment portfolio.

For each country, we solve for the set of efficient unlevered portfolios. The efficient portfolios represent the highest expected return for a given standard deviation in returns (i.e., for a given riskiness in the portfolio). We solve for the efficient frontier when households can invest in t-bills, bonds, equities, and a unit of owner-occupied housing. We also solve for the frontier when households can also invest in an index of house prices, i.e., the national price indexes reported in Figure 4A and 4B.

Table 6 summarizes the results of these calculations. The entries in the table are the increases in expected investment returns at a given level of risk (i.e., standard deviation

**Table 6**  
**Increased Return in Percentage Points from Hedging Housing Risk,**  
**at various Levels of Risk**

Country	Standard Deviation of Return					
	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.30
Belgium	2.92	6.54	6.72	-	-	-
Canada	5.83	9.24	9.29	-	-	-
Denmark	4.35	8.84	11.54	11.68	11.72	11.76
France	6.17	9.67	9.86	9.93	9.96	-
Netherlands	1.08	2.29	3.45	-	-	-
Norway	2.28	5.02	7.01	7.48	7.69	-
Spain	4.36	9.04	-	-	-	-
Sweden	1.82	4.87	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	2.44	4.50	6.52	7.14	7.42	7.58
United States	5.46	7.89	-	-	-	-

Source: See text for assumptions and methods.

in returns) which arise when homeowners are also afforded the opportunity to invest in the index of national home prices. The portfolio solution involves buying an owner-occupied dwelling the house and selling the index, that is, hedging home purchase by selling short an index of house prices.

As the entries in the table suggest, the introduction of this investment opportunity increases returns for any given level of risk, and reduces investment risk for any specified level of returns. For example, for Belgium at low levels of risk (a standard deviation of 0.05), the opportunity to trade in house price derivatives increases nominal investor returns by 2.9 percentage points. At higher levels of risk (a standard deviation of 0.10), hedging increases expected nominal investor returns by 6.5 percentage points.

The quantitative results are quite similar for Norway and for the U.K. The advantages which arise when this object of investment is available are even greater in Canada, France, Spain, and the U.S. At low levels of risk, average returns are increased by 4.4 percentage points in Spain and by over 5 percentage points in Canada, France, and the U.S. The advantages to hedging are somewhat smaller in the Netherlands and in Sweden.

At higher levels of risk, the increased expected returns afforded by the opportunity to hedge house purchases are larger. This is because a higher risk portfolio typically involves a greater exposure to owner-occupied housing. And with more exposure to housing, the benefits from hedging are more pronounced.

Table 7 provides another summary of calculations relevant to evaluating the benefits of hedging. The table presents the probability that the additional returns arising from allowing short sales of the house price index will be negative. As the table indicates, these probabilities are on the order of 0.2 and 0.4, suggesting that sixty or eighty percent of the time the opportunity to hedge housing market investments will lead to higher investment returns. Only for the Netherlands are the entries in the table large, 0.41 to 0.46. Of course, the Netherlands is the country with the lowest expected return from hedging, one to three percent. But even for the Netherlands the probability of increased investor returns from hedging is well above half.

The results presented in Tables 6 and 7 are precise, but of course they are highly uncertain. They are based upon the only house price indexes available, but not micro data on house sales. The results are based upon a sequence of short time series of annual observations, and they consider only a few highly aggregated asset classes. Nevertheless, the results are highly consistent across countries, and they reinforce the more detailed

**Table 7**  
**Probability of Negative Returns from Hedging Housing Risk,**  
**at Various Levels of Risk**

Country	Standard Deviation of Return					
	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.30
Belgium	0.385	0.257	0.327	-	-	-
Canada	0.280	0.178	0.268	-	-	-
Denmark	0.332	0.188	0.221	0.280	0.320	0.348
France	0.269	0.165	0.256	0.310	0.345	-
Netherlands	0.457	0.410	0.409	-	-	-
Norway	0.410	0.308	0.320	0.354	0.345	-
Spain	0.332	0.183	-	-	-	-
Sweden	0.428	0.313	-	-	-	-
United Kingdom	0.404	0.327	0.332	0.361	0.383	0.400
United States	0.292	0.215	-	-	-	-

Source: See text for assumptions and methods.



analyses of the Stockholm and London housing markets described previously. The benefits to consumers of hedging in European housing markets are on the order of several percentage points, *not* several basis points.

## **VI. Practical Details**

The results reported for a panel of developed countries suggest that the ability to invest in house price derivatives increases investor returns, on average, by several percentage points for the same level of risk. The results also suggest that the probability that investor returns are decreased at any given level of risk is small – only for the Netherlands is the probability at all large. It would seem there is a substantial benefit to gathering and processing the sort of information that would form the basis for replicable and routinely produced indices of housing prices – for a metropolitan area or region, or in some cases for an entire country.

The obstacles to a functioning market that would allow European consumers to reduce the riskiness of their investment portfolios are partly technical and partly organizational. On a technical level, index development requires that there be a reputable and replicable method for building and publishing the house price index. And this requires large samples of data.

It may thus be somewhat surprising to learn that sufficient data to publish such an index regularly is apparently routinely collected and is already available centrally for many of

these countries. Table 7 reports on the taxation of owner-occupied housing for OECD countries. As indicated in Panel A, at least eight countries have some form of national taxation on housing capital, and another eight countries administer some form of *ad valorem* tax at the local level. For those countries that tax housing nationally, it is necessary to have some centralized repository for housing data, typically including sales prices and the hedonic characteristics of dwellings. For Sweden, for example, all house sales are recorded and matched to the hedonic characteristics of dwellings in each region (See Englund *et al*, 1998). Similar information is recorded for dwellings in Norway. These data are used for tax assessment and mass appraisal by the authorities who administer the national system of property taxes.

In principle, these data could be used to produce house price indexes for local or national markets using hedonic methods. Indeed, in some part, these data are already used by government officials to produce national and regional price estimates.<sup>1</sup> It would seem to be a straightforward matter to publish the methods used to produce price estimates and to update price indices regularly – for wide distribution to the financial community.

For those countries which do not collect housing price and sales information nationally, the development of a credible and reliable house price index is a bit more complicated. For the U.S., house price indexes for local markets are estimated and reported by a

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<sup>1</sup> See Statistics Sweden ([http://www.scb.se/templates/tableorchart\\_74161.asp](http://www.scb.se/templates/tableorchart_74161.asp)) for an example of the use of these data to produce a national price index by a government agency.

**Table 8**  
**Taxation of Owner Occupied**  
**Housing in OECD Countries**

**A.National Assessments and Taxation**

Denmark\*  
Greece  
Italy\*  
Netherlands\*  
Norway  
Spain\*  
Sweden  
Switzerland

**B. Local Assessments and Taxation**

Austria  
Belgium  
Finland  
France  
Germany  
Iceland  
United Kingdom  
United States

Note: \*Owner occupants are also taxed on house values at the local or regional level.

Source: Peter Englund, "Taxing Residential Housing Capital," *Urban Studies*, 40, 2003: 937-952.

national government agency.<sup>2</sup> These data are reported quarterly for some 300 metropolitan areas and local markets. These indexes rely upon repeat sales (Case and Shiller, 1989) for the development of price indexes, rather than hedonic methods. Recent work has compared the implications of repeat sales methods with hedonic methods for the accuracy of price indexes (Clapham *et al*, forthcoming). The repeat sales index seems to perform well in comparison with a chained Fisher Index estimated using hedonic characteristics. In any case, the goal need not be a perfect representation of unobserved house prices, but rather an index which is reasonably accurate and easily replicable.

Finally, it should be noted that in some countries without government centralized house price information (e.g., the U.K.), banks and financial institutions currently produce and distribute price indexes which are widely regarded as reliable and are used extensively in the financial community.<sup>3</sup>

The organizational barriers to establishing a market in house price indexes may be more formidable than the technical barriers. The advantages to portfolio investors, hedge funds and financial institutions of participating in this market are, perhaps, as obvious as are the advantages to consumers. By taking the long position, i.e., by buying the index from consumers, these institutional investors have, for the first time, direct access to investments in owner occupied housing, by metropolitan area, region, or country. This increases investment opportunities and reduces the aggregate risks to institutions.

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<sup>2</sup> The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight .

<sup>3</sup> For example, the Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) has produced house price indexes for 15 regions in the UK quarterly since 1990. More disaggregated regional data have been published since 1997. Other HBOS indexes are widely used by government departments in the UK as well as businesses.

In developing a market, it is probably important to mobilize potential purchasers of these indexes – large institutions – as well as individual property investors. A form of this investment was offered for several years in the U.K., before disappearing in 2004. Two firms, IG Index and City Index (See Tricks, 2003), offered investors the opportunity to purchase or sell an index of regional house prices, for settlement one to four quarters subsequently. These investments, an example of a rather common form of “spread betting” in the U.K., permitted investors to hedge local housing prices, but only for short periods.<sup>4</sup>

The indexes for these “spread bets” were based upon the Halifax Bank of Scotland regional house price surveys and London land registry transactions. Trading in both these markets was thin and the products were withdrawn in 2004. One lesson from this experience is that it is important to induce portfolio investors and large institutions, not just individual investors and speculators, to develop a thick market. As a correlary, it is probably important to offer index positions longer than four quarters of duration in order to develop an orderly market.

The recent announcement by Macro Securities and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) to begin trading on housing futures using repeat sales price indexes for ten large U.S. metropolitan regions seems better designed to attract institutional investors, hedge funds, builders, and mortgage lenders. The advance publicity surrounding the

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<sup>4</sup> The system worked in the following way. The market maker quotes a buy-sell spread, say 110-120. Optimistic investors would buy at 120; pessimistic investors would sell at 110. When prices move in the next period to, say, 140-150, investors can reverse their trading, closing out positions, and realizing profits (20 for the optimist) and losses (40 for the pessimist). See Quigley and Ward, 2003, for further discussion.

announcement suggests that “A builder putting up a \$100 million subdivision outside Chicago ready for sale in 2008 could buy puts on the Chicago housing index that expire in the summer of 2008. If the housing market plummeted and the company took a bath on the McMansions, it would recoup a chunk of the losses on the rising value of the puts.” (Gross, 2005). The article continues “But it’s unlikely that the people who could most benefit from hedging—individuals—will be big users. Why? These options will cover large markets—it will be tough to hedge the value of your own house, which depends so much on your particular neighborhood. The New York Index covers single family residential homes from the Jersey Shore to New Haven, Conn., a remarkably heterodox stretch....”

The size of the contracts may be unsuitable for some individual household investors. The contract size as listed in the CME research report (Labuszewski, 2005) is about \$65,000. With conventional margin requirements, this is a minimum investment of about \$6,500. It is anticipated that trading on this derivative market will begin in the second or third quarter of 2006. Many investors and many homeowners have a stake in the success of markets such as these.

And this success is at least as important for European homeowners as it is for U.S. consumers.

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